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Abstract
We use detailed survey data to document stark differences between West
and East Ukraine when it comes to household attitudes toward market-based
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ern Ukrainians are decidedly less supportive of liberal systems. We also find
that economic attitudes changed in response to the global financial crisis. West
Ukrainian households who were affected more extensively by the crisis were more
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1 Introduction
Under what circumstances do individual preferences persist, and when are they malleable?
Are personal beliefs influenced by deep-rooted historical factors or rather by more transient
macroeconomic shocks? The Great Recession, which brought unemployment and economic
fragility throughout the world, has turned the spotlight on these questions. This debate has
been especially important for the transition countries in emerging Europe. This is the case
not only because this region was much more affected by the financial crisis than Western
Europe, but also because political, social and cultural cleavages are particularly salient within
as well as across transition countries.
In this paper, we contribute to this discussion by exploring the drivers of social preferences
in Ukraine. We exploit disaggregated data from the second round of the EBRD-World
Bank Life in Transition Survey (LiTS II), a nationally representative household-level survey
administered in fall 2010. In addition to household and demographic information, the survey
includes questions on a wide range of attitudes and values. Importantly, it also collects
detailed information about households’ exposure to the global financial crisis.
Our analysis, which focuses on attitudes towards market economy and democracy, doc-
uments stark differences between West and East Ukraine. On average, those living in the
Eastern part of the country are more than 35% less likely to be in favor of a market-based
economic system and 42% less likely to support democratic institutions. As we argue below,
this evidence provides partial support for theories focusing on persistent cultural differences
as a driver of attitudes. However, we also find that economic attitudes were affected greatly
by the crisis, and that this effect differed markedly between West and East Ukraine. House-
holds who were hit hardest by the Great Recession were most disappointed with the market
economy and this was particularly so in the West. In contrast, in Eastern Ukraine the de-
clining support for market economy was unrelated to crisis exposure. The disillusionment
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with markets among Western Ukrainians was stronger for households who, as a result of the
financial crisis, had to cut down on food consumption, education or had to delay payments
on utilities and loans. While we find that crisis-affected Western Ukrainians were also less
likely to approve of democracy, this effect is less robust.
Although we lack a longitudinal data set, the richness of the survey which we use allows
us to look into the role of some suggestive mechanisms. Since our data are from 2010, one
possibility could be that the East-West cultural divide which we uncover is in fact a conse-
quence of different early transition paths. Accounting for sub-national indices capturing the
severity of the early transition shock (using data on night-time light intensity as a proxy for
local economic activity) suggests that respondents in regions which experienced a greater
initial income loss were also more affected by the recent crisis. Even so, our earlier results
remain broadly similar. A second question is whether our specifications are simply captur-
ing differences between Russian and non-Russian speakers (and their potentially different
cultural mindsets). The latter may dominate in the West and the former in the East. Our
findings speak to the contrary, since additional controls for linguistic, cultural and historical
ties with Russia are insignificant.
Our empirical setup raises two potential identification concerns. First, since the analysis
is based on cross-sectional data, unobserved individual heterogeneity could be a problem,
particularly since the sample of respondents living in East and West is not random. Second,
the extent to which each household was affected by the Great Recession is unlikely to be
exogenous. We adopt several approaches to address these issues. First, we control for a
wide range of observable characteristics that are likely to be correlated with crisis exposure,
place of residence and preferences. These include household income, employment status and
education, as well as Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) characteristics such as urbanity, latitude
and longitude. Second, to rule out geographic sorting of respondents, in all specifications we
control for whether the respondent has ever moved. We show that all our results are robust
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to accounting for out-migration from Ukrainian regions.
Third, we instrument household crisis exposure with the pre-crisis composition of bank
branches in a respondent’s primary sampling unit using detailed data from the second Bank-
ing Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS II, administered by the EBRD). Previous
work has shown that the crisis was an exogenous shock which was transmitted to emerging
Europe mainly through the branch networks of foreign-owned banks (Popov and Udell 2012).
We therefore exploit local variation in the balance-sheet strength of foreign banks in each
PSU to create a branch-weighted proxy for the intensity with which the global financial cri-
sis transmitted to specific geographical localities within Ukraine. We show that households
in PSUs dominated by branches of foreign parent banks which were heavily dependent on
(unstable) wholesale funding were most affected by the crisis.
Our work relates to several strands of the literature. First, we contribute to a large
scholarship which has shown that cultural differences can affect a variety of economic and
political outcomes (see, for instance, Algan and Cahuc (2010); Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2011); Guiso et al. (2006); tab (????)). In addition, we complement an important literature
on the origin of preferences. On the one hand, scholars have argued that culture is stable, as
it may be transmitted vertically (Bisin and Verdier 2001) or influenced by long-run historical
events (Alesina et al. 2013; Becker et al. 2014; Grosfeld et al. 2013; Nunn and Wantchekon
2011). On the other hand, there is evidence that norms can change relatively rapidly. Beliefs
can be affected significantly by macroeconomic and wealth shocks (Ananyev and Guriev 2013;
Di Tella et al. 2007; Fisman et al. 2013; Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014; Grosjean et al. 2013),
access to information (Kuziemko et al. 2013) and political experiences (Alesina and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln 2007). We review these contributions in more detail, particularly as they relate
to the Ukrainian context, in the next section of the paper.
This paper enriches the literature in four important ways. Our results suggest that
deep-rooted factors and more short-lived macroeconomic shocks may interact to determine
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preferences for the market and democracy. This implies that claims emphasizing the im-
portance of either mechanism may be only partially correct. Unlike much of the previous
literature, we do not find that the East-West divide or the crisis explain trust, preferences for
redistribution and risk, views about state paternalism, civic activity and social capital, and
beliefs about the importance of effort versus luck for advancing in life. From an econometric
point of view, focusing on a single large country helps to avoid identification biases present
in cross-country regressions, on which much of the existing literature is based. Our contribu-
tion also stems from the fact that we are able to use disaggregated data from Ukraine prior
to the Russia-Ukraine conflict which have not been explored before.
This paper is organized as follows. The next four sections present our conceptual frame-
work, data, empirical approach and results, respectively. The final section concludes.
2 Macroeconomic shocks and the persistence of pref-
erences
Social scientists studying the origins of preferences and beliefs face an important challenge:
pinpointing the circumstances under which preferences persist and when they change. On
the one hand, several influential studies argue that cultural values are determined by long-run
historical events. For instance, Putnam et al. (1994) attributes the lack of civic competence in
Southern Italy to its autocratic Norman regime in medieval times (as compared to Northern
Italy, which consisted of city-state governments). Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2012) demonstrate
that in Germany, anti-Semitic attitudes and behavior persisted for more than 600 years. In
Africa, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) argue that the slave trade led to permanently lower
levels of trust in slave-sending countries today.
More recently, arguments focusing on the persistence of preferences have been applied to
the Eastern European context as well. Grosfeld et al. (2013) show that current residents of
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the Pale (the area to which Jews were confined in the Russian empire) have lower support for
the market, vote more for anti-market parties, but are at the same time also more trusting.
A possible mechanism suggested by the authors is that ethnic hatred toward Jews generated
both a persistent anti-market culture and trust among the non-Jewish population of the
Pale. In a similar vein, Becker et al. (2014) use geographical regression discontinuity to show
that Eastern Europeans living in areas which were historically affiliated with the Habsburg
empire have higher trust and less corruption in courts and public services today. Both of
these papers use the first round of the LiTS (conducted in 2006).
On the other hand, a different strand of the literature shows that culture is strongly
affected by income shocks, although neither the direction nor the longevity of such effects
is clear-cut. Due to data availability, much of this work has focused on advanced countries
such as the U.S. Looking at welfare attitudes, Margalit (2013) finds that voter preferences
regarding welfare policy depend strongly on personal economic circumstances, but also that
these attitudes do not persist: as job losers regain employment, their support for redistri-
bution decreases significantly. In contrast, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that the
effect of recessions on beliefs is long-lasting. Individuals who experienced a recession when
young are more likely to believe that success in life depends more on luck than effort, support
government redistribution, and vote for left-wing parties. Using lab experiments, Fisman
et al. (2013) instead demonstrate that subjects affected by the recession exhibit higher levels
of selfishness and greater emphasis on efficiency versus equality. Lastly, Mian et al. (2014)
show that financial crises tend to result in shifting political preferences and greater ideolog-
ical divides within countries. The authors suggest that debtors - such as households with
mortgages or other loans - adjust their preferences in particular as they see their net worth
decline most during a financial crisis.
To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have looked at the impact of macroeco-
nomic shocks on preferences in Eastern Europe. Grosjean et al. (2013) (who also exploit
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LiTS 2010) show that preferences for the market and democracy are highly sensitive to large
swings in the business cycle, and that people tend to reduce their support for the prevalent
economic and political system when hit by a negative income shock. Similarly, Ananyev and
Guriev (2013) find that Russian regions which were more strongly affected by the recent
financial crisis experienced a drop in interpersonal trust.1
Credibly identifying the drivers of individual preferences, be they long-term or more
transient, is a challenging task. Exogenous variation in economic conditions is rare, and
macroeconomic and historical changes covary with other observed and unobserved processes.
Although experimental approaches (in the spirit of Fisman et al. (2013)) can help with causal
inference, they are often focused on a very narrow population in a developed country. At
the very least, testing for effects in a different context will help validate existing insights
and further the debate to issues not raised by research in advanced settings. At the other
end of the spectrum, using cross-country analyses may also be problematic due to data
heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns (Pande and Udry 2005).
In this paper, we use three complementary approaches to aid identification. First, by
focusing on within-country variation in economic conditions, geography and preferences, we
avoid the biases typical of cross-country work. Second, not only do we use a very fine-grained
individual measure of crisis exposure, but we also account for a wide range of observable in-
dividual characteristics, such as education and migration history. Third, to rule out possible
endogeneity of our crisis impact measure or reverse causality from preferences, we implement
a new instrument for individual exposure to the Great Recession. In particular, we exploit
cross-locality variation in the extent to which local banking markets were vulnerable to de-
teriorating funding conditions of foreign parent banks during the crisis. We describe in more
detail our data and empirical specification in the next two sections.
1Whether positive income shocks may generate direction-symmetric effects (in Eastern Europe or else-
where) is unclear. In Argentina, squatters who (quasi-randomly) received a housing title also developed
stronger pro-market preferences (Di Tella et al. 2007).
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3 Data
Our main data source is the second round of the EBRD/World Bank Life in Transition
Survey (LiTS) which was conducted in 29 transition countries and Turkey, Italy, France,
Germany, Sweden and the UK in the summer of 2010 using face-to-face interviews. LiTS is a
nationally representative survey that combines modules related to economic and demographic
characteristics, attitudes and values, labor, education and entrepreneurship, climate change,
and the impact of the global financial crisis. Survey respondents (aged 18 and above) were
drawn randomly, using a two-stage sampling method. Census enumeration areas, stratified
by region and by level of urbanity and selected with probability proportional to size, served
as primary sampling units (PSUs), while households served as secondary sampling units.
In Ukraine, 75 PSUs consisting of 20 households each were selected. We supplement these
data with external data on PSU latitude and longitude and detailed information on the
geographical distribution of bank branches across Ukraine as taken from the second EBRD
Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS II).
3.1 Dependent variables
We construct our dependent variable measuring support for market economy based on an-
swers to the following question: With which one of the following statements do you agree
most? (1) A market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system; (2) Un-
der some circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a market economy; and
(3) For people like me, it does not matter if the economic system is organised as a planned
economy or as a market economy. To capture preferences for democracy, we use answers to
the following question: With which one of the following statements do you agree most? (1)
Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system; (2) Under some circumstances,
an authoritarian government may be preferable to an autocratic one; and (3) For people like
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me, it does not matter if a government is democratic or authoritarian. In both cases, we
create a dummy variable which codes answer option (1) as “1”, and answer options (2) and
(3) as “0”. We drop respondents who answered “Don’t know.”
3.2 Independent variables
Exposure to the crisis During the period 2004-2007, Ukraine experienced a credit boom
fueled by rapid inflows of foreign capital that was intermediated locally through predomi-
nantly foreign-owned banks. Foreign-currency denominated consumer lending and household
consumption expanded rapidly. With the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, this
process came to an abrupt end. Deleveraging by branches of foreign parent banks that
were liquidity-starved and capital-constrained, combined with a substantial devaluation of
the hryvnia, meant that many households experienced limited access to new credit or faced
repayment problems as their debt burden had suddenly increased in real terms. As a result,
households had to make quick and often substantial adjustments to their consumption of
goods and services.
We use two complementary measures of household exposure to the crisis: a subjective
and an objective one. The first measure is based on a question which asks to what extent the
crisis affected the respondent’s household in the past two years, with answer options: (1) not
at all; (2) just a little; (3) a fair amount; and (4) a great deal (we label this index as subjective
crisis impact in the regressions below). This index is coded on a 0-3 scale. Our variable
capturing objective crisis exposure exploits information from the following question: In the
past two years, have you or anyone else in your household had to take any of the following
measures as the result of a decline in income or other economic difficulty? The question then
gives a choice of 17 answer options (to which respondents can answer yes or no), including
a decrease in food consumption, tobacco and leisure goods; delaying or withdrawing from
university or a training course; reducing health expenses and doctor visits; delaying utility
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payments or having utilities cut; default on a loan; sale of an asset; or migration. For each
answer option, we create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent took the particular
action, and 0 otherwise. We obtain the objective crisis impact index by adding up these 17
dummy variables.2
Additional variables Our dummy for East Ukraine is based on geographical coordinates
of the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) in which the respondent currently lives. PSUs in East
Ukraine are located in the following regions: Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Dnipropetro-
vsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Nikolayiv, Odessa and Zaporizhzhya.3 Figure
?? illustrates that the East-West divide is culturally and politically salient: the majority of
East Ukrainians are Russian speakers who supported Viktor Yanukovych in the 2010 presi-
dential elections. Our regressions also include controls for PSU latitude and longitude (from
Nikolova and Simroth (2015)) and level of urbanity. At the individual level, we control for
age, age squared, whether the respondent has ever successfully started a business, whether
the respondent has been unemployed in the past 12 months (excluding those who are un-
employed but have started a business), respondent’s self-identified household income (on a
ten-step ladder), education, gender, health status, whether the respondent has lived in the
same locality all their life, and whether the respondent or any family members were part of
the former communist party. Table ?? in the online Appendix provides more information on
our dependent and independent variables.
2This index is equivalent to the synthetic consumption response index of Grosjean et al. (2013). Unfortu-
nately, due to a large number of missing observations for Ukraine, we are unable to utilize an equally useful
survey question which asks whether the household head or another household member lost their job between
2008-2010.
3West Ukraine includes the regions of Cherkasy, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskiy, Kirovohrad,
Kyiv, Lviv, Poltava, Rivne, Sumy, Ternopil, Vinnytsya, Volyn, Zakarpattya and Zhytomyr.
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3.3 Graphical evidence and summary statistics
Figure 1 summarizes the differences in preferences for market economy and democracy in
East and West Ukraine in 2006 and 2010. The figure shows that in 2006, just before the
global financial crisis, support for a market-based economic system was roughly similar in
both parts of the country, while support for a democratic political system was significantly
lower in the East. The 2010 data indicate that residents of the East became significantly
less in favor of both a market economy and democratic institutions. At the same time, on
average, economic attitudes hardly shifted in the Western part of the country, while support
for democracy dropped in line with what happened in the East. The resulting differences
are striking: in 2010, less than 30% of Eastern Ukrainians support market-based economic
systems, while the corresponding figure for Western Ukraine remains at around 42%.
The gap is slightly bigger when it comes to approval of democracy, with 34% of Eastern
Ukrainians in favor of democratic institutions, as opposed to nearly half of Western Ukraini-
ans. Figures 2 and 3 put these large differences into an international perspective by adding
data (for 2010 only) for other countries in the transition region as well as five Western Eu-
ropean comparators (UK, France, Germany, Sweden and Italy). Figure 2 shows that while
support for a market-based economic system is relatively high in West Ukraine (even higher
than in France, Italy and the UK), Eastern Ukrainians are very disapproving of the market.
The within-country difference in support for a democratic political system is also substantial
(Figure 3). In fact, Eastern Ukrainian households display the lowest support for democracy
compared to all countries that were part of the LiTS 2010 survey.
Table ?? presents summary statistics for the variables which we use in our regression
analysis. Our observations are split roughly equally between the two parts of the country,
and respondents in East and West Ukraine are similar across a variety of dimensions. Re-
spondents in the East are significantly more likely to be Russian speakers and marginally
more likely to have been members of the former communist party and to have a post-
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secondary/university degree. Interestingly, the (self-reported) impact of the crisis seems to
be similar across the East and the West.
4 Empirical specification
To investigate differences in preferences for the market and democracy between Eastern and
Western Ukrainians, we run OLS regressions of the following type:
Attitudeip = αip + β1EastDummyp + β2Crisisip + β3EastDummypCrisisip + β4Xip + β5Yp + ip (1)
where for each respondent i in primary sampling unit p, Attitudeip is a dummy variable
capturing either support for market economy or democracy; EastDummyp is a dummy for
whether the PSU is located in East Ukraine, Crisisip is one of the two crises indices, Xip
is a matrix of individual-level controls as described above and Yp is a matrix of PSU-level
controls (including latitude, longitude and a dummy for urban vs. rural locality). We include
survey weights to ensure that the data are representative at the country level and use robust
standard errors. All the results are very similar if we either cluster the errors at the level
of administrative regions,4 PSU level, or instead calculate standard errors using the wild-
bootstrapped approach of Cameron et al. (2008) (to explicitly take into account the small
number of clusters in the specifications when we consider separately East vs. West Ukraine).
Note that although around 1,599 individuals were interviewed in Ukraine, missing data on
some variables implies that the sample with which we work contains between 900 and 1,114
observations.
4Ukraine has 25 administrative regions.
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5 Results
5.1 Main results
Table 1 presents our results using support for market economy as the dependent variable.
In Column (1), we include the East dummy, the Objective crisis impact index and their
interaction (in addition to the individual and PSU controls described above). In column
(2), we include our Subjective crisis impact index, again along with its interaction with the
East dummy. In both columns the results are similar. Focusing on the point estimates in
column (1), the coefficient on Objective crisis impact implies that a one-standard deviation
increase in this variable weakened a household’s support for the market in Western Ukraine
by 9.4%. This is a sizeable effect, as on average only around 36% of Ukrainians are in
favor of the market.5 In contrast, the impact of the crisis on market attitudes in Eastern
Ukraine (obtained by adding the coefficient on Objective crisis impact and East*Objective
crisis impact) is nearly 0.
In columns (3) and (4), we rerun the specification in column (1) separately on East and
West Ukraine, and obtain very similar results. Figure 4 shows the same results graphically.6
Among households unaffected by the financial crisis (located on the very left of the graph),
clear differences in market preferences prevail among those based in the West versus those
in the East. Yet, among households who were more negatively impacted by the crisis we
observe a gradual blurring of the differences in preferences between both parts of the country.
In fact, the preferences of those Western Ukrainian households impacted hardest by the crisis
are no longer statistically different from those of their Eastern counterparts. Of course, this
is also due to the fact that our estimates become less precise as the number of households
severely hit by the crisis diminishes in our sample.
5See Table ?? for means and standard deviations of all variables.
6Figures ?? and ?? replicate Figure 4 using a non-parametric approach.
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The signs of the additional controls are in the expected direction. Respondents who are
unemployed are significantly less likely to support the market, as are those who are male and
who have family members who were part of the former communist party. In contrast, higher
education (particularly having post-secondary and university degree), health and income are
associated with stronger pro-market preferences.
In Table 2, we re-run the regressions in column (1) of Table 1 but instead use more
disaggregated crisis impact indices capturing whether the household had to reduce food con-
sumption; the consumption of luxury goods or leisure activities; education; health services;
or delay payments of utilities or loans. All of these sub-indices are recoded on a 0-1 scale
for comparability. The table shows that Western Ukrainians who had to reduce their spend-
ing on education or food or had to delay payments on utilities or loans are particularly
disapproving of the market.
Next, Table 3 investigates the determinants of preferences for democratic institutions.
On average, respondents in the East are between 35%-40% less likely to support democracy,
as compared with those in the West. Column (1) demonstrates that Eastern Ukrainians
hit by the crisis are slightly more likely to support democracy than Western Ukrainians,
but the effect is smaller compared to the one in Table 1 and only marginally significantl.7
Like in Table 1, the crisis also eroded support for democracy in West Ukraine, though
the latter impact is imprecisely estimated. We find a similar negative (and statistically
significant) effect of the crisis on political preferences in West Ukraine in columns (3) and
(4), which replicate the regressions in column (1) separately for West and East Ukraine,
respectively. However, this result is not robust to using the subjective crisis impact variable
in column (2). Overall, the evidence suggests that the crisis negatively affected preferences
for democracy in West Ukraine, but that it cannot explain the equivalent drop in support
7A one-standard deviation increase in the objective crisis impact index leads to a 6.3% decrease in
democracy support, or around 15% relative to the mean of the dependent variable.
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for democracy in East Ukraine. At the same time, results are less clear-cut compared to
those when support for the market is considered, so they should be interpreted with caution.
In unreported specifications, we re-ran the regressions in Table 3 for democratic preferences
using interactions between the east dummy and disaggregated crisis sub-indices, without
finding any significant effects.
The control variables in Table 3 exhibit some interesting patterns. Respondents who are
older,8 who set up a business at some point in their lives, and who have secondary education
or higher are more likely to support democracy. To conserve space, we omit these additional
controls from the tables to follow.
5.2 Robustness
5.2.1 IV estimations
A potential concern is that our measure of household-level crisis impact may be correlated
with unobservable household or locality characteristics, such as ability or culture. In ad-
dition, it is possible that anti-market individuals may be more likely to report that their
families were hit harder by the crisis (which may partially explain the stronger coefficients
obtained in Table 2). To address such issues related to omitted variables, endogeneity and
reverse causality, we adopt an IV approach where we instrument crisis exposure with the pre-
crisis composition of bank branches in the household’s primary sampling unit. We combine
information on bank branch networks from the second EBRD Banking Environment and
Performance Survey (BEPS II) with geographic coordinates of the PSUs and the individual
branches. We match the households in each PSU with the branches located within a circle
with a 10 kilometer radius around the center of the PSU. All our results hold when we match
based on a 5 kilometer radius or match using the names of the PSU and of the localities
8The quadratic age effect suggests an inverted U-shape effect of age on preferences for democracy, with
the peak occurring at 57 years.
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where the branches are based. Our preferred specification uses the 10 kilometer cutoff as it
maximizes the number of observations in the regressions.
In line with Popov and Udell (2012), we treat the global financial crisis as an exogenous
shock that was first and foremost transmitted to Ukraine through the branch networks oper-
ated by foreign-owned banks. We therefore exploit local variation in the financial soundness
of the foreign banks active in each PSU to create branch-weighted proxies of the intensity
with which the global crisis affected specific localities within Ukraine.9 By focusing on the
financial health of the foreign (rather than domestic) parent banks of the branches operating
across Ukraine, our instrument is unlikely to be affected by PSU economic conditions.10
We construct our instrument by using the branch-weighted ratio of gross loans to cus-
tomer funding in 2006. This ratio was on average 178 in 2006, indicating that many banks in
Ukraine operated on a small depositor base and had become highly dependent on wholesale
funding by the time the crisis unraveled. We hypothesize that branches of banks that were
more dependent on wholesale funding at the outbreak of the crisis, had to reduce lending the
most.11 This implies that households located in PSUs populated by such branches were more
likely to end up credit constrained and, as a result, to be negatively affected by the crisis.
Moreover, we expect that in PSUs which have many branches of wholesale-dependent foreign
banks more foreign-currency denominated consumer and mortgage lending took place before
the onset of the crisis. The unexpected devaluation of the Ukrainian hryvnia in October
2008 will therefore have affected households in these PSUs more severely as they must have
experienced a sharp and sudden increase in the real value of their outstanding debt.
Table 4 presents our IV results. To keep the specifications simple, we only show results
where we split the sample into West and East. For comparability, columns (1) and (4) repli-
9We exclude 20 PSUs without any foreign bank branches.
10Given the large size of the multinational banks that operate in Ukraine, our instrument is also arguably
exogenous to the economic situation in Ukraine as a whole.
11See De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014) for a discussion.
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cate the OLS results from Table 1 (for West and East Ukraine, respectively) on the sample
of PSUs which have at least one foreign-bank branch. Columns (2) and (5) presents results
with the wholesale funding instrument. In line with our priors, the first-stage estimates indi-
cate that households surrounded by foreign banks that operated with a high loan-to-deposit
ratio, were impacted more by the crisis and had to adjust their consumption patterns the
most.
The second-stage results confirm that while the crisis had a strong and negative impact
on preferences for a market-based economic system in the West, such an impact was absent in
the Eastern part of Ukraine. In fact, the IV estimates in column (2) are several times stronger
(in absolute value) compared to those in column (1), suggesting that omitted variables bias
the OLS results downward. For instance, ability is likely to be positively correlated with
market preferences and negatively correlated with crisis exposure. Failing to account for
this variable in the OLS specifications (which use the less precise self-reported crisis impact
index) will lead to attenuation bias.
5.2.2 Validity of the IV approach
The adopted IV strategy would be valid provided that three conditions are satisfied: (1) the
first-stage relationship must be strong; (2) the instrument should not affect preferences for
the market directly; and (3) the instrument should not be correlated with the error term in
the second-stage regression. We examine the validity of each of these assumptions below.
First, our regressions indicate that the instrument indeed explains a significant portion of
the variation in household crisis exposure, with F-statistics comfortably above 10. Second,
an important identifying assumption underlying our instrumentation strategy is that the
financial health of these mainly Western European parent banks only affected market pref-
erences of Ukrainian households through the impact on local lending conditions. This seems
a reasonable assumption as the lending activities of the local branch networks are the only
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direct link between Western parent banks and local households. There is no cross-border
lending from parent banks to local households and small firms.
Third, concerns about omitted unobservable characteristics are less salient as our esti-
mates include a wide range of individual and PSU controls. One may nevertheless worry
that foreign banks with weaker balance sheets - those with a high pre-crisis level of wholesale
funding - sorted into economically weaker PSUs that were more exposed to the crisis. Sim-
ilarly, foreign banks may have positioned themselves in areas with higher export intensity,
and the economic shock which our instrument is designed to capture may be determined
by exposure to foreign markets. To partially address this, in columns (3) and (6) of Table
4 we exclude all branches opened in 2005 and later. This changes our results very little.
If anything, our first-stage relationships are even stronger. This shows that our results are
robust to the exclusion of these recent - and potentially endogenously sorted - branches.
What is more, endogenous sorting by banks is unlikely for an additional reason: foreign
bank entry almost exclusively occurred through the take-over of large pre-existing branch
networks of state banks. Strategic investors only entered Ukraine’s banking system relatively
late, in a privatization wave that occurred during 2005-06 (Ahunov et al. 2013). This sudden
and rapid foreign bank entry followed the removal of Ukraine from the money-laundering
black list of the Financial Action Task Force in February 2004 (Dushkevych and Zelenyuk
2007). Because the take-over wave happened just before the onset of the global financial
crisis, the new foreign bank owners had little time to modify their recently acquired branch
networks by closing or opening branches.
5.2.3 Additional robustness checks
We further probe the robustness of our results in Table 5. To rule out that findings are
driven by geographic sorting of respondents, in column (1) we control for the total regional
emigration rate, while in column (2) we control for the regional share of emigrants who went
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to Russia, the EU-27 countries, and the rest of the world (all measures are from Commander
et al. (2013) who collected them via a survey conducted in the second half of 2011). In
both cases our results are very similar to those in Table 1, while the coefficients on the
additional variables are insignificant, indicating that our findings are not driven by crisis-
related regional population shifts. In column (3), we include a proxy for individual wealth
(calculated as the sum of all assets owned by the respondent’s household) which again makes
little difference to the results. In column (4), we use a different dependent variable to proxy
for pro-market preferences: the extent to which the respondent favors private ownership,
on a 1-10 scale. The results parallel those in Table 1 which is reassuring. In unreported
specifications, we also excluded Kiev from the regressions, and clustered the standard errors
at the regional and PSU levels, which left the results unchanged.
5.2.4 Looking beyond preferences for market and democracy
Are East and West Ukrainians different when it comes to other cultural attitudes? In unre-
ported results, we re-ran our baseline specification using a variety of additional dependent
variables (based on questions from LiTS II), such as trust in others, preferences for redistri-
bution and risk, views about state paternalism, civic activity and social capital, and beliefs
about the importance of effort versus luck for advancing in life. Perhaps surprisingly, in
the majority of cases we do not find that the East-West divide or the crisis have strong ex-
planatory power, suggesting that opinions about market and democracy may be particularly
salient.
At the same time, we find some interesting patterns when we look at attitudes toward
competition, preferences for equality, and opinions about whether economic growth is more
important than political liberties. In the first column of Table 6, we replicate our baseline
results using a variable capturing whether the respondent believes that competition is good
and stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas, as opposed to competition being
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bad and bringing out the worst in people (coded on a 1-10 scale, where 1 is complete support
for competition). While the East dummy is not significant, we find that households affected
by the crisis in West Ukraine are less likely to favor competition, which is consistent with
our earlier findings on preferences for market economy. Interestingly, an opposite pattern
emerges in the second column, which shows that crisis-hit Western Ukrainian households
are less likely to be in favor of income equality (the dependent variable is again coded on
a 1-10 scale, with 1 signifying complete support for equality). Finally, the third column of
Table 6 replicates our baseline results using as a dependent variable a dummy for whether
the respondent believes that economic growth is more important than political liberties.
Eastern Ukrainians are around 36% more likely to believe that political liberties are more
important, though there is some evidence that households affected by the financial crisis are
more likely to be in favor of economic growth.
5.3 Suggestive mechanisms
5.3.1 Early transition paths
Is our dummy for East Ukraine simply a proxy for post-transition economic differences
between the two parts of the country? We test this in Table 7, in which we control for
the PSU-level decline in economic activity between 1992 and 2006 using light intensity data
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).12 Localities which
experienced a more adverse transition shock were more likely to favor democracy, perhaps
because democratic institutions (such as those in Western Europe) may have been implicitly
associated with a stronger safety net. However, respondents in places which experienced a
deep and pro-longed economic contraction are no less likely to support the market. While
the coefficients on our main variables of interest remain broadly unchanged, we find that the
12See Henderson et al. (2012) for a discussion of the use of light intensity data as a proxy for economic
development.
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negative link between the East dummy and preferences for democracy (but not the market)
seems to be driven by households in localities in which economic activity decreased more
during the transition shock of the early 1990s.13
These results support the conjecture that the large attitudinal differences between East
and West in terms of democratic support in part reflect deeper cultural differences. Indeed,
re-running our baseline specification for support for democracy only (in unreported results)
with the 2006 wave of the LiTS (using the East dummy only) produces coefficients on the
East dummy which are not statistically different from those obtained using the 2010 data.
5.3.2 Russian language and media
Are our results driven simply by the fact that Ukraine’s Russian-speaking population is
less favorable toward the market and democracy due to ties with Russia? In Table 8, we
investigate whether our East dummy is a proxy for language differences between Russian-
speaking East Ukraine and West Ukraine. In columns (2) and (4), we control for whether the
respondent is a Russian speaker. Our main results (for market economy) remain unchanged,
suggesting that mere language differences (and the associated cultural differences for which
they proxy) cannot explain our earlier findings. This implies that the cultural cleavages
between East and West Ukraine run deeper than simple differences in the dominant language
in each region.14
However, we also find that Russian speakers and those living in Russian-dominated lo-
calities are less likely to be in favor of democratic institutions. In addition, the inclusion of
a Russian-speaker dummy weakens the coefficient on the East dummy (for the regressions
assessing the drivers of preferences for democracy). This suggests that preferences for democ-
racy (but not the market) in East Ukraine are partially explained by the specific preferences
13This also holds when we measure the decline in light intensity as a percentage relative to the 1992 level.
14We obtain similar results when we use the overall share of Russian speakers in a locality, dummies for a
share above 20% or 50%, or the number of years a particular locality was under Russian jurisdiction or part
of the Soviet Union (unreported).
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of Russian-speaking households (and households living in Russian-speaking communities).
In Table 9 we study to what extent our results are driven by the prevalence of Russian-
language media, rather than Russian speaking population. We exploit 2010 TV broadcasting
data from the Ukrainian State Statistical Committee (Statistical Bulletin 2010). This allows
us to include controls for the share of Russian-language TV broadcasting relative to all
regional TV broadcasting. Although the regional Russian-language broadcasting is positively
related to the share of Russian speakers in the respective region (correlation coefficient of
0.41), the correlation is not perfect. In fact, some of the oblast with most Russian speakers,
such as Donetsk and Luhansk, do not broadcast any regional TV in Russian.15 Respondents
living in regions with more prevalent Russian-language media are less likely to support
democracy, but not any different when it comes to preferences for the market. At the same
time, the coefficients on the East dummy, the crisis variable and their interaction, remain
unchanged.16
5.3.3 A comparison between Ukraine and Germany
To what extent are our results for Ukraine applicable to other countries with strong regional
divisions? One way to test this is to rerun our regressions using data from East and West
Germany, which we do in Table 10 (Germany was included in the 2010 round of the LiTS as a
’comparator’ country). Of course, one caveat to interpreting the results is that the historical
processes which led to a divided Germany were very different from those in Ukraine. Indeed,
Table 10 reveals a very different pattern: East Germans are around 12.5% less likely to
support the market, though this result is borderline significant (columns 1 and 2).17 Unlike
in Ukraine, democratic preferences do not seem to differ between East and West Germany.
15These data do not capture viewership of TV channels directly broadcast from Russia.
16These results also hold when we measure Russian-language broadcasting as average daily hours of
Russian-language TV broadcasting of regional channels.
17Splitting the sample into East and West reveals that both East and West Germans who were hit harder
by the crisis were equally disappointed with the market.
22
Moreover, political and economic attitudes in Germany were not affected by the recent
financial crisis.
6 Conclusion
We exploit the 2010 round of the Life in Transition Survey to show that Eastern Ukrainians
are significantly less likely to support a market-based economic system and democratic in-
stitutions relative to their Western Ukrainian counterparts. Importantly, these preferences
are not immune to external influences. We document that Western households who were hit
harder by the Great Recession are much more disenchanted with the market and became
more like their Eastern peers in terms of their (lack of) market support. We find a similar,
albeit less robust, effect when it comes to democratic preferences.
Our results imply that deep-rooted factors and more short-lived macroeconomic shocks
can interact to determine pro-market preferences, and that the effects of financial crises on
attitudes may be heterogeneous geographically. As a result, short-term economic volatility
caused by financial globalization may quickly undermine public support for market institu-
tions. If persistent, such changing preferences could even lead to reform reversals by driving
countries toward less liberal economic systems.
More suggestively, our results can also be viewed through the lens of the literature that
studies the emergence of civil conflict and violence. One group of scholars argues that
economic grievances (such as those arising from poverty or economic inequality) may be re-
sponsible for the emergence of war (Bru¨ckner and Ciccone 2010; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004).
Others stress that deep-rooted cultural differences are typically at the heart of conflict (Hunt-
ington 1993; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). For the case of Ukraine, both mechanisms
may be at work, as social cleavages appear to be driven by deep-rooted factors as well as by
transient shocks such as the global financial crisis.
23
References
(????): “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe, au-
thor=Tabellini, Guido, journal=Journal of the European Economic Association, vol-
ume=8, number=4, pages=677–716, year=2010, publisher=Wiley Online Library,” .
Ahunov, M., L. Van Hove, and M. Jegers (2013): “Selection and Hidden Bias in
Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions: Ukraine’s Takeover Wave,” EBRD working paper.
Alesina, A. and N. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007): “Good-Bye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect
of Communism on People’s Preferences,” American Economic Review, 97, 1507–1528.
Alesina, A., P. Giuliano, and N. Nunn (2013): “On the Origins of Gender Roles:
Women and the Plough,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, 469–530.
Algan, Y. and P. Cahuc (2010): “Inherited Trust and Growth,” American Economic
Review, 5, 2060–2092.
Ananyev, M. and S. Guriev (2013): “Effect of Income on Trust: Evidence from 2009
Crisis in Russia,” Working paper.
Becker, S. O., K. Boeckh, C. Hainz, and L. Woessmann (2014): “The Empire
Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the
Bureaucracy,” The Economic Journal.
Bisin, A. and T. Verdier (2001): “The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the
Dynamics of Preferences,” Journal of Economic Theory, 97, 298–319.
Bru¨ckner, M. and A. Ciccone (2010): “International Commodity Prices, Growth and
the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa,” The Economic Journal, 120, 519–534.
Cameron, A. C., J. B. Gelbach, and D. L. Miller (2008): “Bootstrap-Based Im-
provements for Inference with Clustered Errors,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 90,
414–427.
Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (2004): “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford
Economic Papers, 56, 563–595.
Commander, S. J., O. Nikolaychuk, and D. Vikhrov (2013): “Migration from
Ukraine: Brawn or Brain? New Survey Evidence,” IZA Discussion Paper.
De Haas, R. and I. Van Lelyveld (2014): “Multinational Banks and the Global Finan-
cial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm?” Journal of Money Credit, and Banking, 46,
333–364.
Di Tella, R., S. Galiant, and E. Schargrodsky (2007): “The Formation of Be-
liefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Titles to Squatters,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122, 209–241.
24
Dushkevych, N. and V. Zelenyuk (2007): “Ukrainian Banking Sector: Evolution and
Current Stage,” Ukrainian Observer, 225, 951.
Fisman, R., P. Jakiela, and S. Kariv (2013): “How Did the Great Recession Impact
Social Preferences?” Unpublished Manuscript.
Giuliano, P. and A. Spilimbergo (2014): “Growing up in a Recession,” Review of
Economic Studies, 81, 787–817.
Gorodnichenko, Y. and G. Roland (2011): “Individualism, Innovation, and Long-run
Growth,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, 21316–21319.
Grosfeld, I., A. Rodnyansky, and E. Zhuravskaya (2013): “Persistent Anti-Market
Culture: a Legacy of the Pale of Settlement after the Holocaust,” American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 5.
Grosjean, P., F. Ricka, and C. Senik (2013): “Learning, Political Attitudes and Crises:
Lessons from Transition Countries,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 41, 490–505.
Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales (2006): “Does Culture Affect Economic
Outcomes?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 23–48.
Henderson, J. V., A. Storeygard, and D. N. Weil (2012): “Measuring Economic
Growth from Outer Space,” The American Economic Review, 102, 994–1028.
Huntington, S. P. (1993): “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 22–49.
Kuziemko, I., M. I. Norton, E. Saez, and S. Stantcheva (2013): “How Elastic are
Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments,” NBER
working paper.
Margalit, Y. (2013): “Explaining social policy preferences: Evidence from the Great
Recession,” American Political Science Review, 107, 80–103.
Mian, A., A. Sufi, and F. Trebbi (2014): “Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Con-
straints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises,” American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 6, 1–28.
Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Querol (2005): “Ethnic Polarization, Potential Con-
flict, and Civil Wars,” American Economic Review, 796–816.
Nikolova, E. and D. Simroth (2015): “Religious Diversity and Entrepreneurship in
Transition: Lessons for Policymakers,” IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, 4, 1–21.
Nunn, N. and L. Wantchekon (2011): “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in
Africa,” American Economic Review, 101, 3221–3252.
25
Pande, R. and C. Udry (2005): “Institutions and Development: A View from Below,”
in The Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society. Cambridge
University Press.
Popov, A. and G. F. Udell (2012): “Cross-Border Banking, Credit Access, and the
Financial Crisis,” Journal of International Economics, 87, 147–161.
Putnam, R. D., R. Leonardi, and R. Y. Nanetti (1994): Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press.
Statistical Bulletin (2010): “Media and Publishing in Ukraine in 2010,” State Statistics
Committee of Ukraine.
Voigtla¨nder, N. and H.-J. Voth (2012): “Persecution Perpetuated: the Medieval
Origins of Anti-Semitic Violence in Nazi Germany,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127,
1339–1392.
26
Figure 1: Preferences for market economy and democracy in east vs. west Ukraine, 2006
and 2010
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Figure 2: Support for market economy across countries
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Figure 3: Support for democracy across countries
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Figure 4: Effect of the financial crisis on market preferences in east vs. west Ukraine
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Source: LiTS 2010. Notes: This chart plots coefficient estimates from column (1), Table 1.
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Table 1: Preferences for a market economy in east and west Ukraine
West East
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market economy preferable
East −0.369∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.081)
Objective crisis impact −0.048∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact 0.040∗∗
(0.018)
Subjective crisis impact −0.056∗∗
(0.023)
East ∗ Subjective crisis impact 0.078∗∗∗
(0.030)
Age 0.001 0.003 0.005 −0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Age2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed excl. start-up −0.132∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗ −0.124∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.060) (0.053)
Start-up 0.104 0.120 0.138 0.063
(0.070) (0.076) (0.109) (0.092)
Income 0.022∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.016 0.027∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016)
Secondary education 0.144 0.150 0.184∗ 0.068
(0.090) (0.096) (0.106) (0.145)
Post-secondary / university degree 0.181∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.199∗ 0.137
(0.091) (0.095) (0.109) (0.142)
Male −0.077∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.034) (0.036) (0.047) (0.050)
Health 0.058∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.034 0.088∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.024) (0.032) (0.030)
Communist −0.056∗ −0.070∗ 0.009 −0.093∗∗
(0.034) (0.036) (0.057) (0.043)
Ever moved −0.016 −0.022 −0.020 0.003
(0.032) (0.034) (0.049) (0.044)
Urban 0.019 0.017 0.116∗∗ −0.077
(0.035) (0.035) (0.048) (0.050)
Longitude 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Latitude −0.049∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.028
(0.014) (0.015) (0.032) (0.017)
Observations 987 900 480 507
Source: LiTS 2010. Notes: This table explores the drivers of preferences for a market economy in eastern
and west Ukraine. See the text for more information on the socio-economic and PSU controls included in
the regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Preferences for a market economy in east and west Ukraine: disaggregated crisis impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market economy preferable
East −0.326∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.077) (0.067) (0.070) (0.067)
Reduction in foods −0.129∗∗∗
(0.048)
East ∗ Reduction in foods 0.152∗∗
(0.063)
Reduction in luxury or leisure −0.070
(0.049)
East ∗ Reduction in luxury or leisure 0.035
(0.063)
Reduction in educ. −0.420∗∗∗
(0.132)
East ∗ Reduction in educ. 0.590∗∗∗
(0.171)
Reduction in health services −0.106∗
(0.055)
East ∗ Reduction in health services 0.020
(0.069)
Delay in payments on utilities or loans −0.213∗∗
(0.106)
East ∗ Delay in payments on utilities or loans 0.245∗
(0.137)
Individual controls X X X X X
PSU controls X X X X X
Observations 987 987 987 987 987
Source: LiTS 2010. Notes: This table explores the drivers of preferences for a market economy in east and west Ukraine using
disaggregated objective crisis-impact indices. See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in the
regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Preferences for democracy in east and west Ukraine
West East
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy preferable
East −0.425∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.079)
Objective crisis impact −0.020 −0.027∗∗ 0.016
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact 0.032∗
(0.016)
Subjective crisis impact −0.019
(0.023)
East ∗ Subjective crisis impact 0.008
(0.030)
Age 0.011∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Age2 −0.000∗ −0.000∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed excl. start-up −0.030 −0.026 0.013 −0.074
(0.040) (0.041) (0.062) (0.054)
Start-up 0.162∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.167 0.123
(0.076) (0.078) (0.113) (0.106)
Income 0.018 0.019 0.010 0.027∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016)
Secondary education 0.119 0.198∗∗ 0.258∗∗ −0.058
(0.091) (0.097) (0.110) (0.161)
Post-secondary / university degree 0.163∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.041
(0.092) (0.096) (0.116) (0.158)
Male −0.054 −0.060∗ −0.086∗ 0.001
(0.034) (0.035) (0.048) (0.048)
Health 0.039 0.044∗ 0.036 0.051
(0.024) (0.025) (0.034) (0.032)
Communist −0.023 −0.015 −0.017 0.008
(0.035) (0.037) (0.055) (0.045)
Ever moved −0.013 −0.008 −0.007 0.008
(0.033) (0.035) (0.050) (0.046)
Urban 0.044 0.059 0.053 0.050
(0.035) (0.036) (0.050) (0.047)
Longitude 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.015
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Latitude −0.075∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.032) (0.017)
Observations 1016 924 490 526
Source: LiTS 2010. Notes: This table explores the drivers of preferences for democracy in east and west
Ukraine. See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in the regressions.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Preferences for a market economy in east and west Ukraine: IV specifications
West East
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Market economy preferable
Objective crisis impact −0.052∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.157 −0.040
(0.016) (0.083) (0.057) (0.014) (0.101) (0.046)
Socio-economic controls X X X X X X
PSU controls X X X X X X
F-stat. 15.69 29.94 11.38 20.30
Wholesale funding 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Wholesale funding, excluding new branches 0.010∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Observations 366 366 333 331 331 299
Source: LiTS 2010. Notes: This table explores the drivers of preferences for a market economy in east and west Ukraine using IV estimations.
See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in the regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Preferences for market economy in east and west Ukraine: robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market economy preferable Favour private ownership
East −0.355∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗ −2.385∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.083) (0.080) (0.425)
Objective crisis impact −0.047∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.065)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact 0.039∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.097)
Emigration rate −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Share of emigrants to Russia 0.002
(0.003)
Share of emigrants to EU27 0.003
(0.003)
Share of emigrants to ROW 0.000
(0.003)
Asset count 0.021∗
(0.012)
Socio-economic controls X X X X
PSU controls X X X X
Observations 987 987 987 1114
Source: LiTS 2010. Notes: This table explores the drivers of preferences for market economy in east and west
Ukraine. See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in the regressions.
ROW stands for ”rest of the world”. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Opinions about competition, equality and the importance of economic growth versus political liberties in east
vs. west Ukraine
(1) (2) (3)
Favor competition Favor inc. equality Prefer economic growth over political liberties
East −0.295 −0.863∗ −0.360∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.443) (0.061)
Objective crisis impact −0.109∗∗ −0.124∗ −0.010
(0.054) (0.064) (0.010)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact 0.111 0.187∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.076) (0.095) (0.014)
Individual controls X X X
PSU controls X X X
Observations 1114 1114 937
Source: LiTS 2010. See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in the regressions.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.36
Table 7: Suggestive mechanisms: difference in transition paths and preferences for markets and democracy in east vs.
west Ukraine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market economy preferable Democracy preferable
East −0.369∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗ −0.378∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.081) (0.076) (0.076)
Objective crisis impact −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.021∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact 0.040∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.030∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016)
Decline in light intensity 0.009∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
Individual controls X X X X
PSU controls X X X X
Observations 987 987 1016 1016
Source: LiTS 2010. See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in
the regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Suggestive mechanisms: language differences and preferences for markets and democracy in east vs. west Ukraine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market economy preferable Democracy preferable
East −0.369∗∗∗ −0.366∗∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.076) (0.076)
Objective crisis impact −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.021∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.031∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Russian speaker −0.012 −0.078∗∗
(0.039) (0.039)
Individual controls X X X X
PSU controls X X X X
Observations 987 987 1016 1016
Source: LiTS 2010. See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in
the regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Suggestive mechanisms: Russian language media and preferences for markets and democracy in east vs. west
Ukraine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market economy preferable Democracy preferable
East −0.369∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗ −0.444∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.076) (0.076)
Objective crisis impact −0.048∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact 0.040∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Perc. share of Russian-language TV broadcasting −0.002 −0.006∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Individual controls X X X X
PSU controls X X X X
Observations 987 987 1016 1016
Source: LiTS 2010. See the text for more information on the individual and PSU controls included in the regressions.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 10: Preferences for markets and democracy in former East and West Germany
Market economy preferable Democracy preferable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East −0.125∗ −0.126∗ −0.043 0.004
(0.064) (0.064) (0.057) (0.058)
Objective crisis impact −0.017 0.001
(0.012) (0.010)
East ∗ Objective crisis impact −0.036 0.005
(0.022) (0.023)
Subjective crisis impact −0.022 −0.033∗
(0.021) (0.019)
East ∗ Subjective crisis impact −0.081∗ −0.046
(0.045) (0.045)
Individual controls X X X X
PSU controls X X X X
Observations 979 955 998 974
Source: LiTS 2010. Notes: This table explores the drivers of preferences for market
economy and democracy in former East and West Germany. See the text for more
information on the individual and PSU controls included in the regressions. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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